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Abstract. Understanding the neural structures and physiological mechanisms 
underlying human planning is a difficult challenge. In fact it is the product of a 
sophisticated network of different brain components that interact in complex 
ways. However, some data produced by brain imaging, neuroanatomical and 
neurophysiological research, are now beginning to make it possible to draw a 
first approximate picture of this network. This paper proposes such a picture in 
the form of a neural-network computational model inspired by the Dyna-PI 
models (Sutton, 1990). The model is based on the actor-critic reinforcement 
learning model, that has been shown to be a good representation of the anatomy 
and functioning of the basal ganglia. It is also based on a “predictor”, a network 
capable of predicting the sensorial consequences of actions, that may corre-
spond to the lateral cerebellum-prefrontal and rostral premotor cortex pathways. 
All these neural structures have been shown to be involved in human planning 
by functional brain-imaging research. The model has been tested with an animat 
engaged with a landmark navigation task. In accordance with the brain imaging 
data, the simulations show that with repeated practice performing the task, the 
complex planning processes, and the activity of the neural structures underlying 
them, fade away and leave the routine control of action to lower-level reactive 
components. The simulations also show the biological advantages offered by 
planning and some interesting properties of the processing of “mental images”, 
based on neural networks, during planning. On the machine learning side, the 
model presented extends the Dyna-PI models with two important novelties: a 
“matcher” for the self-generation of a reward signal in correspondence to any 
possible goal, and an algorithm that focuses the exploration of the model of the 
world around important states and allows the animat to decide when planning 
and when acting on the basis of a measure of its “confidence”. The paper also 
offers a wide collection of references on the addressed issues. 
1   Introduction 
Planning can be defined as the process by which an agent shapes its behaviour on the 
basis of the capacity to predict the consequences of its own actions. Human planning 
has been extensively studied in neuropsychology, both with normal subjects and pa-
tients with localised brain damage (see Fuster, 1997, for references). These studies 
have also proposed specific tests for planning capacities, such as the Tower of London 
Test (Shallice, 1982). This test requires anticipating the consequences of actions in 
order to plan how to move some rings so as to achieve a certain final configuration 
(goal). Planning is also present in non-human primates. For example Boesh and Boesh 
(1984) have shown that chimpanzees are capable of planning and optimising their 
movements in space in order to collect suitable “hammers” to use in their nut-cracking 
activities. In the case of rats, Tolman (1932) has postulated the presence of “mental 
maps” and anticipatory mechanisms (the S-R-S units) to explain the results of some 
experiments. In one of the most famous of these experiments rats select a long path to 
a reward, instead of a short one, because they anticipate that the latter has been 
blocked after a third path, the shortest of the three, has been blocked. 
Fig. 1. A schematic representation of the network of neural components and pathways (arrows) 
underlying planning in humans. White dots indicate relay nuclei of the thalamus 
While there is little empirical evidence on the specific physiological mechanisms 
involved in the processes of foresight and planning, there are an increasing number of 
studies, carried out through the modern neuroimaging techniques, that show which 
different neural districts of the brain play a role in them. These studies have shown 
that planning requires the integration of the activity of a complex network of several 
neural components (see Fig. 1, explained in detail in the next section). This is proba-
bly the result of the way in which evolution operates: new behavioural functions are 
usually built by exploiting and “recycling” simpler pre-existing structures and mecha-
nisms (Gould and Lewontin, 1979). This is a leading theme of this paper. 
The goal of this paper is to present a computational model that tries to summarise 
available behavioural, anatomical, and physiological evidence on planning in a coher-
ent picture. The soundness and completeness of the model are tested and illustrated 
employing an autonomous animat engaged with a landmark navigation task. 
Section 2 illustrates in detail the empirical evidence on planning addressed by this 
paper. Section 3 illustrates the simulations' scenario and the animat used to test the 
model, explains the reactive and planning components of the model, and suggests 
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which neural structures and mechanisms of the real brain they may correspond to. 
Section 4 shows the results of the simulations. Section 5 remarks the limitations of the 
model. Section 6 reviews the related work and highlights the model’s novelty. Section 
7 draws the conclusions. 
2   Behaviour, brain imaging, anatomy and physiology 
The neuropsychological literature mentioned in the introduction has furnished a vast 
body of evidence that indicates that prefrontal areas (Fig. 1) play a fundamental role in 
the anticipation of actions’ consequences and planning. For example, patients with 
impairments in these areas fail the Tower of London test (Shallice, 1982; Fuster, 
1993). 
Fig. 2. A schematic representation of the neural components of the basal ganglia. Thin and 
bold arrowheads indicate glutammate excitatory and GABA inhibitory connections respec-
tively. The dashed arrow indicates dopamine connections 
Modern functional neuroimaging techniques have produced some of the most in-
teresting data on planning. In particular they have shown which brain areas are active 
at different stages of planning. Toni et al. (1998) have scanned by fMRI (functional 
Magnetic Resonance Imaging) the brain of a subject engaged in working out an un-
known sequence of finger taps on a key pad by trial and error (“sequence learning”). 
Although this kind of tasks can be learned with a simple reactive learning architecture 
(cf. section 3.2), planning makes learning more efficient since it allows quick explora-
tion of different alternatives and error avoidance (Doya, 1999). At the beginning of 
the experiments some areas traditionally associated with planning, such as the prefron-
tal cortex and rostral premotor areas, were active. Low-level areas, traditionally asso-
ciated with motor control, such as the basal ganglia and the cerebellum, were also 
active. Interestingly, as the subject became more skilled at executing the motor se-
quence, the neural activity became confined to just the low-level areas (see Doya, 
1999, for a review on these experiments and Middleton and Strick, 1994, for cerebel-
lar and basal ganglia’s involvement in high cognitive functions). Indeed, Graybiel 
(1998) has argued that basal ganglia play an important role in “short-circuiting” and 
chunking motor action sequences. Prefrontal and rostral premotor areas, as well as the 
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lateral cerebellum, have also been shown to be active during imagery of body move-
ments (Deiber et al., 1998). 
Little is known about the specific circuits and mechanisms that the prefrontal and 
premotor cortex use when they predict while planning (but see Fuster, 1997, and 
Frank et al., 2000, respectively for an extended review and a nice computational 
model of the role that the basal ganglia-frontal cortex circuits play in working mem-
ory. Working memory, that likely plays an important role in planning, is not modelled 
here). Instead, a lot is known about the specific circuits and mechanisms with which 
the basal ganglia and the cerebellum operate. They are now briefly reviewed. 
Fig. 3. A schematic representation of the neural circuits of the cerebellum. The 
numbers in the parentheses indicate the number of synapses per one Purkinje cell. 
Thin and bold arrowheads indicate excitatory and inhibitory connections respectively 
Fig. 2 illustrates the neural circuits of the basal ganglia (striatum and globus pal-
lidus; Kandel et al., 1991). The striatum (putamen and caudate nucleus) has afferent 
connections from the whole cortex. The striatum is composed of two distinct parts, the 
striosomes and the matrix. The striosomes project to the dopamine neurons of the 
substantia nigra pars compacta. The dopamine neurons project back to the striatum 
where they enhance learning (Houk et al., 1995) by LTP (Long Term Potentiation, 
Rolls and Treves, 1998). The matrix projects to the internal division of the globus 
pallidus and to the substantia nigra pars reticulata. The globus pallidus projects to the 
frontal cortex (prefrontal cortex and motor and premotor areas) via the thalamus, and 
in this way affects skeletal movements. The substantia nigra pars reticulata plays a 
similar role in eyes’ movements by projecting to the superior colliculus (not shown). 
The striatum - external globus pallidus - subthalamic nucleus pathway forms the “indi-
rect pathway”, whose function is still very uncertain. As regards the physiology, the 
striatum - globus pallidus - thalamus pathway implements a double inhibition mecha-
nism (through the GABA neurotransmitter) that has been suggested to be the basic 
process by which basal ganglia trigger movements, short term memories, and other 
mental computations (Chevalier and Deniau, 1990). The substantia nigra pars com-
pacta - striatum pathway carries a dopamine signal that regulates learning. 
Fig. 3 shows the main circuitry of the cerebellum (Kandel et al., 1991). The mossy 
fibre conveys the input signals to the cerebellum. After being re-coded by granulate 
cells, this signal reaches the Purkinje cells with a massive convergence. The Purkinje 
cells are the output layer of the cerebellum and project, via the cerebellar nuclei, to 
several spinal and cortical systems often involved in motor control. Each Purkinje cell 
also receives an input from one climbing fibre originating in the inferior olive. The 
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cerebellum has a highly modular structure divided in “microzones”. As regards the 
physiology, the synapses between the parallel fibre and the Purkinje cells can be 
weakened by LTD (Long Term Depression, Rolls and Treves, 1998) when parallel-
fibre activity and climbing-fibre activity converge on the same Purkinje cell. This 
event releases the mossy fibre-cerebellar nuclei excitatory pathway from the inhibition 
of the Purkinje cell (Ito, 1984). 
3   Methods 
The model is built by following a twofold approach. First, a bottom-up analytical 
approach is followed. The empirical data presented in the previous section are used to 
build the architecture and way of functioning of the model. Second, a top-down syn-
thetic approach is followed. A non-trivial task, that should resemble some challenges 
that animals encounter in real environments, is used to test the model. The task used 
here involves the control of an animat, endowed with noisy sensors and actuators. The 
adoption of non-trivial behaviours highlights the functional and behavioural con-
straints that the model should satisfy, and hence guides the inclusion of relevant ele-
ments into the model itself. Note that sometimes there are no empirical data suggest-
ing which mechanisms and architectures may underlie a particular behaviour. In these 
cases, computational solutions are adopted that do not have a known empirical corre-
spondent (they will be indicated as “arbitrary”). These solutions should not be judged 
too severely as they may suggest testable ideas for empirical research. 
3.1   Environment and animat 
The environment used for testing the model is a square arena with sides measuring 1 
unit (Fig. 4). Inside the arena there are 5 circular landmarks/obstacles that the animat 
can see with a one-dimension horizontal retina covering 360 degrees with 50 contigu-
ous sensor units (vector x). Each unit gets an activation of 1 if a landmark is in its 
scope, 0 otherwise, and is affected by noise (0.01 probability of flipping). The signals 
coming from the retina are aligned with the magnetic north through a "compass" 
whose reading is affected by Gaussian noise (0 mean, 1 degree variance). Before be-
ing sent to the controller, these signals are re-mapped into 100 binary units represent-
ing the image "contrasts" y (edge detection). Two contiguous retinal units activate one 
contrast unit if they are respectively on and off, another contrast unit if they are re-
spectively off and on, and no contrast units if they are both on or both off (Fig. 4). The 
contrasts implement a minimum expansion re-coding (Rolls and Treves, 1998) that 
allows the system to solve the task (Baldassarre, 2002). CMAC, an architecture in-
spired by the structure of the cerebellum and often used within the reinforcement 
learning literature, implements a more sophisticated expansion re-coding than the one 
used here. It could not be used here because it requires a vector of few continuous 
variables as input to work effectively (Albus, 1971). At each cycle of the simulation 
the animat has to select one of eight actions, each consisting of a 0.05 step in one of 
eight directions aligned with magnetic north (north, north-east, etc.). The outcome of 
these actions is affected by Gaussian noise (0 mean, 0.01 variance) so that an action 
takes the animat to a position within a small area centred on the point where it “in-
tends” to go. If the animat moves against the arena's boundaries or obstacles it is set to 
the previous position. The animat’s task is to reach one of three goal positions (north-
west, north-east, and south-west) from a start position (Fig. 4). If Sn is the set of n 
states of the world, Go is the set of o possible goals, and Am is the set of m actions, the 
solution of this task implies finding the mapping (Sn×Go)→Am. Notice that if the goal 
is given, the mapping reduces to Sn→Am. 
Fig. 4. Left: The simulations' environment containing three goals (stars), five land-
marks/obstacles (black circles), the scope of the animat’s 50 visual sensors (delimited by the 
rays), the animat at the start position (white circle). Right, in descending order: The sensors' 
activation at the start position, the corresponding contrasts, and the three goals (contrasts) 
3.2   Actor-Critic reinforcement learning 
Fig. 5 shows both the reactive (reinforcement-learning) and the planning components 
of the model presented here, and the brain structures that may correspond to them. 
The reactive components are based on the actor-critic models (Sutton and Barto, 
1998). Actor-critic models are among the best available computational models of the 
anatomy and functioning of basal ganglia (Houk et al., 1995; Doya, 1999; see Baldas-
sarre, 2001, for a detailed computational model, based on the actor-critic model, of the 
possible role in motor control of the double inhibition mechanism implemented by the 
basal ganglia’s matrix). Actor-critic models are also particularly appealing because, on 
the psychological side, they are among the best computational models of both classical 
and instrumental conditioning (Balkenius and Moren, 1998; Baldassarre and Parisi, 
2000; actor-critic models are a generalisation of the influential classical conditioning 
model of Rescorla and Wagner, 1972; cf. also Lieberman, 1993). 
In general terms, the actor learns to select actions in correspondence to the input 
patterns (states of the world) in order to obtain rewards and avoid punishments. The 
evaluator, that together with the TD-critic makes up the critic, learns to evaluate the 
input patterns in terms of future average rewards that the animat should expect starting 
to move from them. Note that this evaluation depends on the actor’s action-selection 
policy. The evaluator improves its evaluations by a supervised learning algorithm 
  
 
when the animat experiences rewards and punishments in the environment. The actor 
improves its action-selection policy by increasing the probabilities of those actions 
that lead to ascend the evaluation gradient field generated by the evaluator in corre-
spondence to the environmental states. 
Fig. 5. Architecture of the model. Networks with a bold and thin border implement reinforce-
ment learning and planning respectively. The numbers refer to the units of the layers. Arcs and 
arrows indicate respectively forward and backward connections that "copy" a pattern from one 
layer to another. The four and five spike stars indicate the “channels” set respectively open and 
close by the action-planning controller when acting (vice versa when planning). Dashed arrays 
indicate the learning signal used to update the weights of the evaluator and actor. Labels in 
Italics indicate the brain structures that may correspond to the model’s components 
Now the components of the model are explained in detail, and the possible human 
brain structures that may correspond to them are indicated. Note that the units of the 
model correspond either to neural units or to neural assemblies. 
The matcher is a hand-designed “arbitrary” network that generates an internal re-
ward signal r on the basis of the similarity between the goal and current (contrast) 
input yt. A goal is the (contrast) image corresponding to the goal position. When the 
goal and the current input have at least 94% of bits with same value, the matcher re-
turns 1 otherwise it returns 0 (see Baldassarre, 2002, for the details of this network). 
The threshold 94% has been chosen because it produces a satisfactory small size of 
the area recognised as goal (Fig. 6). It is assumed that a memory process (not in the 
model) evokes the image of the goal that the animat pursues. The goal images may be 
generated in the frontal areas (e.g. in the case of eyes’ movements the targets of sac-
cades are coded in the frontal eye fields, Kandel et al., 1991). The recognition of the 
goal may take place here or in the sensory areas themselves (see Kosslyn, 1999). 
The matcher can also be interpreted in a different way. Animals have innate neural 
structures that map some inputs from the environment to internal reward or punish-
ment signals. These inputs signal states relevant for adaptation, for example the pres-
ence of food or body damage (primary reinforcements). Usually the internal signals 
are produced only if a proper appetitive need, e.g. hunger, is present (Rolls, 1999). In 
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the model, the presence of a certain need is indicated by a signal (the goal signal) 
coming from the body, while the states relevant for adaptation are signalled by suit-
able sensors (e.g. the sensors in the mouth that detect the ingestion of food). Within 
this interpretation, the matcher may correspond to some limbic structures that are 
activated only by the co-occurring presence of a need signal and a suitable sensory 
pattern (Rolls, 1999). In both the cases of goals and needs (planning and reactive 
behaviour), the matcher’s output is sent to the substantia nigra pars compacta where 
the dopamine neurons produce the signal that enhances learning in the striatum. 
Fig. 6. Left: Activation of the matcher for the north-west goal in 30×30 different positions in 
the arena (cells of the grid). White cells mark positions recognised as goal, black cells mark 
positions where the contrast input has more than 84% of bits in common with the goal. Right 
(see section 4 for details): Activation of the evaluator for the north-west goal in 20×20 different 
positions in the arena after the animat has become competent for the north-west goal. Notice 
that the evaluations form a gradient field over the positions. The cell with a bold border indi-
cates the position of the pursued goal. The size of the white and black cells is respectively 
proportional to the positive and negative evaluation given in that position. The big white cells 
irregularly scattered in the graph are caused by temporary sensory noise. Spots of entirely-grey 
cells correspond to the landmarks 
The actor selects the actions on the basis of the sensory (contrast) input yt. It is 
made up by a two-layer feed-forward neural network with eight sigmoid output units 
that locally encode the actions. To select an action, the activation mk[yt] (interpretable 
as "action merit") of each output unit k is sent to a stochastic selector that implements 
a winner-take-all competition. The probability P that a given action ag becomes the 
winning action aw to execute is given by: 
P[ag = aw] = mg[yt] / ∑k mk[yt] 
The actor may correspond to the matrix of the striatum in the basal ganglia (Houk 
et al., 1995). The firing of one cell assembly of the striatum may release a suitable 
thalamus - frontal cortex pathway corresponding to a particular action, from the tonic 
inhibition of the globus pallidus. This event triggers the action (double inhibition 
mechanism, Fig. 2). The winner-take-all competition may be nicely implemented by 
the thalamus - frontal cortex reciprocal loops on the basis of a stochastic mechanisms 
proposed by Hanes and Schall (1996) with regards to eye movements: the first cell 
assembly that accumulates an activation above a certain threshold triggers the eye 
saccade corresponding to it. 
 
The evaluator estimates the average future rewards that can be achieved from a 
given (perceived) state of the world yt. The evaluator is a two-layer feed-forward 
neural network. Its linear output unit yields the estimation V'π[yt] of the evaluation 
Vπ[yt]. Vπ[yt] is defined as the expected discounted sum of all future reinforcements r, 
given the current actor's action-selection policy π: 
Vπ[yt] = E[γ0 rt+1 +γ1 rt+2 +γ2 rt+3 + …] 
where γ∈(0, 1) is a discount factor (set to 0.95) and E is the mean operator. 
The TD-Critic is a neural implementation of the computation of the Temporal-
Difference error et (Sutton and Barto, 1998) equal to the difference between the esti-
mations of Vπ[yt] produced at time t+1 ({ }t+1) and t ({ }t): 
et = {(V'π[yt])}t+1 – {(V'π[yt])}t = (rt+1 + γ V'π[yt+1]) - V'π[yt] 
The evaluator may correspond to the striosomes of the striatum and the TD-Critic 
may be implemented by the indirect pathway and the substantia nigra pars compacta 
(Houk et al., 1995). The error et corresponds to the substantia nigra’s dopamine signal 
(Shultz et al., 1997) and is the base of learning for both the actor and the evaluator. 
The evaluator is trained by a Widrow-Hoff algorithm (Widrow and Hoff, 1960) 
that uses the error signal et. The weights wi are updated as follows: 
∆wi = η et yi 
where η is a learning rate (0.1 in the simulations) and yi is the activation of the con-
trast unit i. This rule implies that the evaluator's estimation V'π[yt] is made closer to 
the target value (rt+1+ γ V'π[yt+1]). This target is a more precise evaluation of yt be-
cause it is expressed at time t+1 on the basis of the observed rt+1 and the new estima-
tion V'π[yt+1]. 
The actor is trained with a Widrow-Hoff algorithm according to the TD-Critic's 
error signal. The change of merit values is achieved by updating the weights wwi of the 
neural unit corresponding to the executed action aw (and only this): 
∆wwi = ζ (4 mw (1 - mw)) et yi 
where ζ is a learning rate (set to 0.1), and (4 mw (1 - mw)) is the derivative of the sig-
moid function multiplied by 4 to homogenise the size of the learning rates of the actor 
and the (linear) evaluator. 
When a new goal is assigned to the animat, the weights of the evaluator and actor 
are randomised in the interval (-0.001, +0.001), so the evaluations produced by the 
evaluator's linear output unit are about 0 (initially every state is “neutral” for the ani-
mat), and the merits and probabilities produced by the actor and the stochastic selector 
are respectively about 0.5 and 0.125 (initially the animat explores the environment 
randomly). When the animat gets a reward (the matcher fires 1), the evaluator learns 
to evaluate the state just visited with an evaluation higher than 0 (classical condition-
ing, Baldassarre and Parisi, 2000). If this state is met again in the future, the state 
preceding it is evaluated more than 0 and so on: “neutral” states progressively acquire 
positive evaluations. These evaluations decrease with the distance from the goal due 
to the discount factor γ, and so form a gradient field higher for states closer to the 
goal. At the same time the actor increases the merit and probability of the actions that 
lead to ascend this gradient field (instrumental conditioning, Baldassarre and Parisi, 
2000). 
 
3.3   Dyna-PI model and planning 
The basic architecture of a Dyna-PI model (Sutton, 1990) is shown in Fig. 7. The core 
of the model is an actor-critic model as the one illustrated in the previous section. The 
evaluator implements the “evaluation function” and the actor the “action policy”. The 
novelty is the “model of the world”. This model is composed of two functions, the 
state transition function ST, and the reward function R (these functions might be sto-
chastic, cf. Sutton and Barto, 1998): 
yt+1 = ST(yt, at)               rt+1 = R(yt, at) 
Notice that the world model can be used to predict the consequences of actions, in 
terms of reward and future state of the world, one step later. The key idea of the Dyna-
PI models is that an agent endowed with a world model can produce “simulated ex-
perience” through it and train the evaluator and actor in the same way it would train 
them through real experience. Assuming that the world model is enough accurate, if 
the actor is trained with simulated experience its performance in the real world im-
proves, hence this process is a form of planning. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 7. The architecture of a Dyna-PI model. The evaluation function and the action policy can 
be improved both on the basis of the experience from the real world and from the world model 
Dyna-PI models are particularly attractive from a biological perspective because 
they allow the implementation of planning by adding few components to a reinforce-
ment learning system. This may mimic the way evolution has built the sophisticated 
function of planning on the basis of pre-existing reactive functions (cf. introduction; 
Doya, 1999). 
The planning model presented here is inspired by Dyna-PI models. It is made up 
by the actor-critic model of the previous section and by other two components, the 
“action planning controller” and the “predictor”. The action planning controller de-
cides when to act and when to plan, and manages the flow of signals between the 
component networks of the model. The predictor implements the state transition func-
tion of the world model. Notice that the reward function of the world model is imple-
mented by the matcher for every possible goal. 
The predictor is composed of 8 feed-forward two-layer networks (“experts”) with 
sigmoid output units, each corresponding to one action. Each expert takes yt as input, 
and is specialised in predicting the following sensors' activation xt+1 if the action cor-
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responding to it is executed (to this purpose the output of each expert’s sigmoid unit is 
squashed to 0 if below 0.5, to 1 if above). Given an action, a hand-designed selector 
chooses the expert corresponding to the selected action to generate the output of the 
predictor. The use of experts instead of a monolithic network highly facilitates the 
training of the predictor (Baldassarre, 2002). The experts are trained to predict the 
consequences of actions while the animat randomly selects and executes actions in the 
environment. This training is done before the simulations of the next section and lasts 
for 200,000 cycles. During each cycle of training the animat observes xt (and com-
putes yt), selects a random at and executes it, observes xt+1, and trains (with a Widow-
Hoff rule) the expert corresponding to at to predict xt+1 on the basis yt. At the end of 
this training period the quadratic error per unit was 0.24. Notice that here there is a 
simplification: the predictor is deterministic while the effects of actions are stochastic. 
The predictor may correspond to the cerebellum-prefrontal and premotor cortex 
pathway, and the experts to the cerebellar “microzones”. The training of the predictor 
is a form of “latent learning” (Tolman, 1932: cf. introduction). 
The animat can be either in planning or acting mode. The action-planning control-
ler, an “arbitrary” algorithm (Fig. 8), decides the animat’s mode on the basis of its 
"confidence", defined as the highest of the actions' probabilities. A more elegant 
measure of the confidence would have been the “entropy” (Shannon, 1948) but this 
possibility was thought about only recently. If the confidence is above a threshold the 
animat acts in the real world and the predictor is not used, otherwise it is used, to-
gether with the matcher, to “mentally” simulate experience. While planning, the 
threshold decreases (variable “Decay”) so that the animat acts after some time spent 
planning. This prevents the animat from getting stuck in places where it does not suc-
ceed to become "confident" enough. While acting the threshold is increased up to a 
maximum (“MaxConfThresh”). 
While planning the actor and critic function and learn in the same way they do 
when the animat acts in the real world. In particular, in a cycle of planning these 
events take place: the matcher, the actor, and the evaluator take the signal from the 
sensors/contrasts activated by the predictor (or from the world if it is the first step of a 
"mental walk", see later) as input; the matcher returns the reward signal, the evaluator 
returns the evaluation of the input pattern, the TD-Critic returns the TD-error, the 
actor yields the actions' merits, the stochastic selector yields the probabilities and 
selects an action; the selected action and the input pattern are sent to the predictor, 
which in its turn yields the predicted input using the expert corresponding to the ac-
tion. At this point a new cycle can take place, producing a new reward, a new evalua-
tion, and a new TD-error; this new error is used to train the actor and evaluator to 
evaluate and act in correspondence to the old input pattern. 
Given a goal, if planning the animat executes several planning cycles in a se-
quence, and several of these sequences (Fig. 8 shows the algorithm that does this). 
Each sequence is a sort of "mental walk" that starts from the current input pattern, 
continues through a succession of predicted images, and terminates either when the 
goal is mentally reached or when the sequence is longer than a certain number of steps 
(MaxStepsPlan). This number is increased if mental walks fail to reach the goal, while 
it is decreased if they succeed. This process focuses the “mental explorations” around 
the start and goal patterns. The generation of forward sequences of possible states is 
reminiscent of the “iterative-deepening search” used in artificial-intelligence problem 
solving (Korf, 1985). It is also interesting to mention that when humans are planning, 
for example when they are playing chess, they consider few possible moves from the 
initial situation (about 4), and then reconsider them repeatedly, each time generating a 
longer forward sequence (Wagner and Scurran 1971). 
IF(NewGoalHasBeenAssigned) 
  MaxStepsPlan := 1 
  ConfThresh := MaxConfThresh 
IF(InputOutputRealWorld) 
  IF(Confidence < ConfThresh)  
    Planning := TRUE 
    StepPlan := 0 
  ELSE     Planning := FALSE 
    ConfThresh := MIN(MaxConfThresh, ConfThresh + Gain) 
IF(Planning) 
  InputOutputRealWorld = FALSE 
  StepPlan := StepPlan + 1 
  ConfThresh := ConfThresh - Decay 
  IF(GoalReached OR StepPlan = MaxStepsPlan) 
    InputOutputRealWorld := TRUE 
    StepPlan := 0 
    IF(GoalReached) 
      MaxStepsPlan := MIN(MaxStepsPlan, StepPlan * 2) 
    ELSE 
      MaxStepsPlan := StepPlan + 1 
ELSE 
  InputOutputRealWorld := TRUE 
Fig. 8. Pseudo-code of the planning-acting controller, executed at each cycle after the activa-
tion of the actor. Decay = 0.00001, Gain = 0.01, MaxConfThresh = 0.15 
The algorithm has been implemented with a Boolean-like network. Since this net-
work was “arbitrary” it is not reported here. The only interesting aspect of this net-
work was a unit corresponding to the variable InputOutputRealWorld. This unit was 
maximally activated when the animat was acting, while it was switched off when the 
animat was planning. It is interesting that several brain imaging experiments (e.g. 
Raichle, 1998) have shown that certain areas of the brain, such as the insula cortex on 
the lower face of the frontal lobes, are regularly switched off when the brain is plan-
ning and dealing with novelty. The problem of how the brain decides when focussing 
on internal processes as planning and when engaging in a direct interaction with the 
environment is an interesting open issue. 
4   Experiments, results and discussion 
The first simulation has been run to compare the performance of the animat with 
the reactive components only and the animat with both the reactive and planning com-
ponents. In both cases the animat is set at the start, and its task is to reach the north-
west goal. Each time the animat reaches the goal it is set at another position randomly 
selected in the arena. This is done for 50,000 cycles. Each cycle implies the execution 
of one action and eventually, in the case of the “planning animat”, several planning 
loops). Then the animat is set again at the start and is assigned the north-east goal, 
pursued again for 50,000 cycles with the same modalities. The same is done for the 
south-west goal. Fig. 6 shows the evaluation gradient field produced by the evaluator 
over the environment positions for the north-west goal. Even if the gradient field is 
quite irregular due to the simplicity of the contrast pre-processing, it is still enough 
accurate to guarantee a satisfying performance. Fig. 9 shows the performance of the 
reactive animat and the planning animat (averaged over 10 random seeds). The total 
number of steps used to reach the current goal is plotted against the cycles for both 
animats. The planning cycles that the planning animat spends planning before reach-
ing the goal is also plotted. 
Fig. 9. Performance (sampled every 100 cycles, and then smoothed with a 10-step moving 
average) for the three goals of the learning animat (action = steps per success) and planning 
animat (action – planning = steps per success; planning = planning cycles per success), against 
the cumulated cycles. The plots are an average over 10 random seeds 
The first interesting result is that the reactive animat reaches a new goal in 1700-
2000 steps on average. After repeated trials with the same goal the reactive animat 
learns to reach the target in fewer steps (50 on average) from any position in the arena. 
In contrast, the planning animat reaches a new goal in about 200 steps from the very 
first time the goal is assigned to it. This performance is made possible by a consider-
able amount of "mental processing": the planning cycles needed to reach the goal the 
first time (averaged over 10 random seeds) are 62,004  40,116  17,840 respectively 
for the three goals (note that the y-axes of Fig. 9 is cut at 2000). This processing al-
lows the animat to mentally reach the goal several times and to increase the confi-
dence above the its threshold. 
These data show one advantage rendered to animals by the capacities of predicting 
and planning. These capacities allow the animat to reach any goal from any start posi-
tion with satisfying efficiency from the first time the goal is pursued. In terms of the 
formalism introduced in section 3.1, this means that given a goal the planning animat 
is capable of building the mapping Sn→Am on the fly, and hence of solving the more 
complex mapping (Sn×Go)→Am using the small memory capacity of the weights of the 
evaluator and actor. On the contrary, the reactive animat can solve the Sn→Am map-
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ping problem only at the cost of repeated experience in the world. If this experience is 
costly or risky to gather, the advantage rendered by the capacities to predict and plan 
can be significant. Moreover, the reactive animat cannot solve the (Sn×Go)→Am map-
ping problem altogether even if given enough experience about all possible goals, 
because of the limitations of the evaluator and actor’s memory capacity (Baldassarre, 
2002). 
Fig. 10. Examples of mental walk from the start to the north-west (top graph) and north-east 
(bottom graph) goal. The action selected has been manually fixed to north-west and north 
respectively. Each graph shows: the prediction of the next sensory activation in terms of activa-
tion pattern of the selected expert’s sigmoid output units; this pattern after being squashed; the 
action used to generate the prediction. 
 
Some caveats qualify these results. First, the planning animat has some additional 
resources, namely the predictor’s weights, which could be used to increase the storing 
capacity of the reactive animat’s actor and evaluator. Second, when given a goal, the 
planning animat needs time to compute the relevant part of the mapping (Sn×Go)→Am, 
while a reactive trained animat can yield the mapping with a simple "forward" compu-
tation. Third, the acquisition of a good world model requires experience that could be 
used to learn to reach specific goals. However, an important fact remains true: the 
goal-independent information stored in the predictor allows the planning animat to 
flexibly pursue any goal. This is not true of the reactive animat. 
With repeated experience the planning animat shows two other relevant changes in 
behaviour. First, when the same goal is pursued several times, the amount of planning 
needed to reach the goal decreases sharply and soon falls to zero. The reason is that 
the outcome of planning is stored ("compiled") into the weights of the evaluator and 
actor, so that the animat’s reactive components become competent (and “confident") 
enough to reach the goal without further planning. Second, the experience in the real 
world further improves the performance, taking it from about 200 to about 50. This 
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means that the outcomes of mental and real experience merge suitably in the weights 
of the critic and actor. 
 
Fig. 11. Two examples (recorded after 200,000 planning cycles) of successful mental walks 
that end in the north-west goal and start from the centre of the arena. Notice the actions se-
lected by the animat and tested within the mental model. 
Fig. 10 shows the outcome of two simulations that illustrates the nature of the 
"mental walks" of the planning animat. In these simulations the animat has been set at 
the start and the selected action has been manually fixed to north-west and north re-
spectively. In both cases a sequence of 29 cyclic predictions (images produces by the 
predictor) has been recorded and plotted in the figure. The animat has a good capacity 
to "imagine" the consequences of actions, for example it can predict the appearance of 
landmarks from behind other landmarks, but it also makes some mistakes, for example 
losing track of landmarks or imagining the appearance of non-existing landmarks. 
Fig. 11 refers to a simulation where the planning animat has been set at the centre 
of the arena and had to plan to go to the north-west goal. The confidence threshold 
was set to a high value so that the animat kept planning without moving. After 
200,000 cycles of planning, the predictions starting from the current real visual input 
(centre of the arena) were recorded until the goal was mentally reached (Fig. 11 shows 
two mental walks starting with a different image because of sensory noise). These and 
other runs show a good capacity to predict, for example notice that in the right graph 
the image of a wrongly lost landmark is recovered. However, they also show other 
mental walks that fail as they converge to images that do not correspond to real situa-
tions. Notwithstanding these problems, the capacity to generate meaningful images for 
29 succeeding steps is quite surprising: why does not noise accumulate and why do the 
mental images tend to keep their coherence with real situations? A possible explana-
tion is this. Image sequences corresponding to possible “walks” in the real world tend 
to be attractors for the mental image sequences generated by the predictor, with basins 
of attraction capturing noisy images (see Wiggins, 1990, for the concepts of “attrac-
tor” and “basin of attraction”). This is made possible by the neural networks' capacity 
of producing categories of output patterns with less within-group variance than the 
corresponding input patterns (Rolls and Treves, 1998). This capacity has been proba-
bly exploited here: for each action the predictor has learned to associate relatively few 
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images, those corresponding to real situations, with many possible noisy versions of 
the images preceding them. When chains of images are produced in a sequence, each 
on the basis of the previous one, this property gates out noise. If this interpretation is 
correct, this might be an interesting mechanism that preserves the coherence with 
reality of “mental image” sequences generated by feed-forward networks. 
5   Limitations of the model and future work 
The major limitations of the model, that suggest the possible directions of the fu-
ture work, are as follows: 
- The model should be tested with a real robot to find out its weak points and con-
sequently improve its robustness. For example, the model is affected by “percep-
tual aliasing” (Whitehead and Ballard, 1991) because of the simplicity of the con-
trast pre-processing (Baldassarre, 2002). 
- The success of planning may strongly depend on the accuracy of the world model 
(however, recall that in the simulations presented here the residual quadratic error 
per unit after the predictor’s training is quite high, 0.24, but the whole system can 
still function properly). 
- The delta rule used throughout the model is computationally powerful but, with 
the exception of the cerebellum, it is not biologically plausible (Rolls and Treves, 
1998). Therefore, the use of Hebbian-like rules should be investigated for the 
evaluator and actor’s learning. 
- The action-selection mechanism of the stochastic selector and the expert selection 
of the predictor are not yet implemented in detailed neural terms (cf. section 3.3 
for a similar problem for the action-planning controller). 
While planning, and differently from humans (Wagner and Scurran, 1971), the 
model needs to consider the same images (situations) tens of times to decide what to 
do in correspondence to them. This may reflect the fact that the current model has 
only a slow learning memory, similar to the one implemented by the cortex, and lacks 
a one-shot learning memory, similar the one implemented by the hippocampus 
(McClelland et al., 1995). 
6   Related work and novelty of the model 
Together with the Dyna-PI models, the other important category of biologically 
plausible models of planning are those based on place cells and the activation-
diffusion mechanism (see several examples in Meyer et al., 2000). These very interest-
ing models are inspired by the rat hippocampus’ place cells that selectively respond to 
a certain place in the environment, by the associative computational properties of the 
hippocampus, and by the Tolman-like experiments mentioned in the introduction. 
These models are usually based on maps of Kohonen-like units (Kohonen, 1982) that 
store environment’s “snapshots” in their weights. Latent learning allows the formation 
and/or strengthening of lateral connections between place cells corresponding to con-
tiguous places in the environment. Planning is implemented by “injecting” activation 
to the goal place cell, allowing it to diffuse through lateral connections with a progres-
sive attenuation, and selecting the actions so to ascend the activation gradient field 
formed over the place cells and corresponding places, by the activation diffusion 
process. 
The model presented here differs from these models because: (a) places are repre-
sented by patterns of active cells (one “feature” of a place is represented by one active 
unit) instead of “implicit” weight patterns (one “feature” of a place is represented by 
one weight), and planning is based on an active process of explorations of the possible 
actions’ consequences, so the model is more suited to simulate the processes of human 
imagination and planning; (b) it allows one cell to participate to the representation of 
more places (distributed representation: this differs from the local representation re-
quired by the place cells to allow the activation diffusion process); (c) it suggests that 
human planning is based on several neural components, not just one as the hippocam-
pus, in accordance to the brain imaging experiments. 
Frank et al. (2000) and Arbib and Dominey (1995) presented two computational 
models of the basal ganglia, but they focused on the role they play in short term mem-
ory and in reactive eye movements respectively, not on planning as it has been done 
here. Connolly and Burns (1995) presented a computational model of how basal gan-
glia might implement planning through an activation-diffusion mechanism, but they 
have not considered the interactions of basal ganglia with other parts of the brain. 
The actor-critic part of the model is as in Barto and Sutton (1998). The only dif-
ference is in the computation of the action probabilities: the more complex soft-max 
function used by them produced a more unstable behaviour. The planning part of the 
model is inspired by the Dyna-PI models (Sutton, 1990) but it also introduces two 
important novelties with respect to them. The first novelty is that the system proposed 
here, contrary to the Dyna-PI models, can execute genuine taskable planning. In gen-
eral, by “taskable planning” (cf. Sutton, 1991) we refer to a planning process by which 
an animat pursues a new goal on the basis of the goal independent information stored 
in the model of the world, without the need of previously (physically) visiting it to 
experience a reward signal. The system proposed here is taskable because the matcher 
is a “universal reward generator” that allows the animat to produce a self-generated 
(“mental”) reward in correspondence to any possible goal-state. When any novel 
goal-state is assigned to the animat, this can “close its eyes”, plan by using the reward 
internally generated by the matcher, “open its eyes” and reach the goal efficiently in 
the real world. On the contrary, Dyna-PI models need to physically reach the goal few 
times before planning, since they are not capable of generating a mental reward in 
correspondence to it. As a consequence of this deficiency, so far Dyna-PI models have 
only been used to speed up learning (i.e. to “propagate” positive evaluations to states 
preceding the rewarding goal-state on the basis of the model of the world: e.g. Sutton, 
1990; Long, 1992; Moore and Atkeson, 1993; Wiering et al., 1998) and not to execute 
genuine taskable planning. The idea of the matcher, that can be implemented in rela-
tively straightforward ways, is theoretically very important when dealing with 
autonomous agents. Notice that since Dyna-PI models cannot perform taskable plan-
ning, a direct comparison with the model studied here is not possible. 
The second novelty introduced by the model is the “action-planning controller” 
that allows (a) an exploration of the model of the world focussed on the current state 
and the goal state (algorithm of Fig. 8), and (b) the decision of when acting and when 
planning on the basis of a measure of the animat’s “confidence”. Dyna-PI models do 
not use any heuristic to guide the exploration of the model of the world (see Moore 
and Atkeson, 1993, for an heuristic applicable only to the cases where states are not 
decomposed into features as here). Moreover, Dyna-PI models do not propose any 
solution to the problem of when acting and when planning. Notice that the literature 
on Dyna-PI models has underestimated this problem since they have not been applied 
to taskable planning. 
Doya (1999) suggested the idea that the cerebellum-cortex pathway may have the 
role of general predictor of the action consequences. Moreover, he suggests the possi-
bility of a planning model based on mental training, like the one developed, imple-
mented and tested in detail here. 
Parisi et al. (1990) and Tani and Nolfi (1999) respectively present an animat and a 
robot that learn to predict. Thrun et al. (1991), Schmidhuber and Wahnsiedler (1992), 
and Tani (1996), present some neural planners based on gradient descent processes 
applied to planning problems formulated in terms of differentiable cost functions. 
7   Conclusion 
This paper has presented a biologically plausible model of how the human brain (and 
perhaps non-human primate brain) may execute planning. The model suggests that the 
basal ganglia implement the control of motor behaviour, trial-and-error learning of 
this behaviour, and the capacity to learn to evaluate environmental situations with 
regards to goal situations. It also suggests that the cerebellum-cortex pathways imple-
ment the capacity to predict and to learn to predict the consequences of actions. 
The main contributions of the paper are the following: (a) the model presented is a 
biologically plausible account of the functioning of the complex network of human 
brain structures involved in planning, that agrees with some brain-imaging, anatomical 
and physiological data; (b) on the basis of a concept of “confidence”, the model pre-
sents a hypothesis of how experience might decrease the need of engaging in planning 
with a complex neural machinery (high level neural components), and allow the pro-
duction of behaviour through a shortcut reactive circuitry (low level neural compo-
nents); (c) the model has been tested by using it to control an autonomous animat 
engaged in a non-trivial navigation task: this guarantees that the model is sound and 
complete; (d) the model extends the Dyna-PI models making them taskable; (e) a 
novel algorithm that decides when to plan and when to act, and guides “mental walks” 
while planning, has been proposed; (f) the simulations have investigated the nature of 
the predictions generated by the model while planning. In particular they have shown 
how some properties of feed-forward neural networks allow them to produce se-
quences of images that are coherent with real situations and do not accumulate noise. 
Some parts of the model are little more than working hypotheses, for example the 
matcher’s goal recognition, the modularity of the predictor, and the planning algo-
rithm. However, since these parts are implemented in precise computational terms, the 
attempt to falsify them can guide research and suggest more reliable alternative solu-
tions. 
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